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27.05.2007
SRI LANKA: IMPLICATIONS OF LTTE'S DELFT ATTACK -Update No 121
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
The Sea Tigers, the naval arm of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) carried out a successful strike on the Sri Lanka Naval detachments located in Delft Island (Nedunthivu in Tamil) on the night of Thursday, May 24, 2007. The Sea Tigers lost seven cadres and made away with weapons and equipment of the naval detachments. Though the LTTE has claimed killing 35 sailors, the Navy also probably lost an equal if not a little more seamen manning the posts. In the sea and air operations that followed, the navy has claimed knocking off at least two LTTE boats. However, the importance of the operation does not lie in the body count or the number of boats sunk as made out by both sides playing for the media galleries. It has dealt an invigorating dose of confidence to the LTTE. Coming in the wake of its successful air operations, this dose of confidence is more lethal in the long term.
There is a need to understand this raid in the emerging overall operational scene in the north, particularly in Jaffna. The island territories of Jaffna peninsula are important outposts that provide early warning of sea movements, infiltrations, and impending sea, land and air attacks. The largest chain - Kayts group of islands - extending from Karaithivu in the north to Mandaithivu in the south, with Poonkudutivu on the south west forms a formidable barrier to seaborne infiltration into Jaffna peninsula from the west. Other than Delft, which stands on its own as the south western sentinel, these islands are well connected with causeways to the peninsula which make them part of the peninsular defence system. However, the lagoon waters around are shallow and restrict naval movement. Understanding the importance of the Kayts islands complex to the overall scheme of things, security forces had managed to control and dominate them for a long time. The Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) is present there to assist the government in ensuring that the LTTE activity does not get out of hand. Security forces had always been sensitive to LTTE infiltration into Kayts and had ruthlessly dealt with any civilian of the island suspected of LTTE affiliation.
It might be remembered that Kayts islands had been one of the important targets of LTTE when it launched the multi-pronged offensive in August 2006 that failed. [See SAAG Note No 325 dated Aug 15, 2006 "Sri Lanka - LTTE Strikes Back -Update No. 98 available at http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes4%5Cnote325.html for detailed analysis]. Almost all the LTTE infiltrators who had landed on the island were eliminated in the search and destroy operations of the security forces that followed after the LTTE attack.
Delft Island, the largest inhabited island of the peninsula, is conveniently located almost equidistant from Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu and Jaffna. Thus it is a valuable outpost to monitor sea and air movements not only towards Jaffna but also between Mannar and Tamil Nadu coast. It had always been under the control of navy which has anti aircraft, surveillance and security elements located there. In fact Delft Island acts as the cockpit of navy to monitor the sea traffic to Tamil Nadu from the Mannar coast and Indian boat movements around Kachchativu. In the present context, when LTTE's international supply chains are in disarray, the sea lanes of supply from Tamil Nadu have become essential in sustaining its operations. Thus the naval surveillance elements at Delft are a valuable part of peninsular defence. The LTTE's newly acquired air capability has perhaps made it also an important point in the air defence network of Jaffna.
The Delft attack also needs to be seen in the setting of following developments in the north:
- During the last eight months or so, the Navy has strengthened its presence in these waters and successfully managed to keep a check on LTTE Sea Tiger operations off Mannar coast. Despite repeated efforts, the Sea Tigers had not been able to make much headway. In all likelihood, surveillance elements in Delft had been playing an important role in this. This was perhaps the reason why the LTTE wanted to put them out of action. The small force of about 16 LTTE boats used to carryout the strike and the completion of the actual operation in an hour (though the disengagement process appears to have taken much longer) would indicate that it was a commando raid rather than a full scale operation to capture and hold territory. (In any case, it is doubtful whether at present the LTTE has the capability to capture and hold the island which has an area of about 42 square kilometres.)
- LTTE had been infiltrating its cadres in penny packets into Jaffna for sometime now. They had been establishing cache of weapons and taking up opportunity targets, using irregular tactics. Aware of the danger of allowing free run to such elements security forces have been carrying out vigorous search operations frequently. Even as we write there is a search operation in progress in Thenmarachi. The security forces have also killed a few cadres in encounters in the region. A few cadres have been apprehended in round ups and security screenings. By and large these LTTE cadres appear to operate in small teams of three-four persons armed with rifle, grenade and, at times Claymore mines. Weapons stashed away for their use in Jaffna have also been recovered in quite a few cases. LTTE snipers and operatives have also managed to inflict some casualties on troops along forward defended lines particularly in Thenmarachi area. Apart from this, one can see the hands of LTTE agent provocateurs in acts like the torching of a bus in Jaffna, and stirring up of student trouble in the university, in order to prevent Jaffna from coming to terms with a restricted life disrupted after the closure of A9 highway.
- Security forces operations to open up the Omanthai-Madhu-Mannar axis have been inching their way forward for sometime. In the course of these operations, LTTE has lost some important leaders though the claims of inflicting high casualties by both sides could not be corroborated. As I had stated in my earlier papers, further advance of security forces along this axis could threaten LTTE's freedom to dominate the coast along areas north of Talaimannar. At some stage in the near future, LTTE will perhaps be compelled to contain and push back the advancing security forces. This would further reduce LTTE's reserves available for offensive operations in the north.
- In Mullaitivu area, relentless air strikes have destroyed many LTTE assets. LTTE's efforts to infiltrate into Pulmoddai area of Trincomalee had come to naught more than once, causing loss in men and material. Similarly, LTTE's probing forays into Welioya area also have not made much headway. Sea Tigers in Mullaitivu sector have been virtually hemmed in.
Given the above operational setting, LTTE with its morale buoyed by the disproportionately high impact of its successful air operations, had to reassert itself in a sea or land operation. The isolated surveillance and sentry posts in southern part of Delft Island offering better chances of success perhaps suited the needs of LTTE. This attack was also perhaps to remind the Jaffna citizens that LTTE is still in the reckoning, despite its seeming inability to fulfil its much touted desire to recapture Jaffna.
A few hours after the Delft attack, LTTE carried out a claymore blast near the Colombo Port, hitting an Army bus and killing one soldier and injuring three civilians. Possibly the Army bus was the target. However, the timing of this attack soon after the Delft strike is apparently aimed at increasing the feeling of insecurity among the population.
The Delft attack has shown that the surveillance post was not able to detect the approaching LTTE fleet of boats. Is this one more case of radars switched off in the night or the radar remaining unserviceable for want of spares? In any case it reflects poorly on the professionalism of forces manning the post. The absence of adequate response to the attack from the naval base indicates either the absence of or deficiency in contingency plans on handling surprise attacks. On the other hand, LTTE has shown considerable thought in the choice of target, and in meticulous planning and execution of operations.
According to the LTTE spokesman LTTE had captured two anti aircraft machine guns, two machine guns, one RPG launcher and eight rifles in the Delft operations. According to the well known columnist DBS Jeyaraj, the LTTE had also managed to carry away the radar unit in addition to seizing the weapons. If this is correct it is a sizeable gain, particularly as it deprives the post of radar surveillance capability. The loss of anti-aircraft machine guns is also a serious one, as it is an extremely useful weapon for taking on targets both at sea and air. Thus Delft will be depleted of some of its surveillance and anti aircraft capabilities till the losses are made up, which could take some time. Thus it is clear that the LTTE intention was two fold to knock off the anti-aircraft and surveillance capability of Delft and augment its own anti-aircraft arsenal.
Is the Delft attack is a curtain raiser for LTTE's Jaffna operations as some commentators have speculated? To hazard a guess, so far the ground indications of LTTE's activity appear to be more aimed at keeping the security forces at bay rather than launching an all out offensive.
However, of greater interest to us is the increasing LTTE assertion in the neighbourhood of India. Delft has demonstrated what a surprise LTTE strike could do. Two weeks back an Indian trawler 'Sri Krishna', hijacked by LTTE in March, 2007, was sunk in Maldivian waters. On their release from custody, 11 members of its original 12-member Indian crew have confirmed that it was LTTE that had arrested them after taking over their vessel. The Tamil Nadu government had no hesitation in publicising this information, much to the dismay of LTTE sympathisers and fellow travellers in Tamil Nadu. Information from Maldives indicates that the LTTE probably seized the vessel to tranship weapons from another ship in an area well outside the beat of Indian and Sri Lankan navies. This would indicate the conscious effort of LTTE to elude Indian and Sri Lankan navies' ocean surveillance to bring in its weapons.
With all these happenings in close proximity of Indian waters involving Indian vessels and citizens, one would have expected the Government of India to react more visibly. However, it had continued to follow its policy of maintaining a stony silence despite the act of piracy by an insurgent group involving a vessel flying the Indian flag. This is not the first act of LTTE piracy involving Indian assets. LTTE had hijacked a Jordanian ship Farah III in distress off the coast of Mullaitivu on December 23, 2006. It was carrying 14,000 tons of rice from India to South Africa which had been seized by LTTE. Then also the Government of India had ignored the whole affair. This attitude is all the more surprising, considering the readiness with which it had expressed its "concerns" as and when Indian fishing boats trespassing into Sri Lankan waters are rounded up or driven off by the Sri Lankan navy. Is there a political angle in this issue involving national security? It should not be. If so, it would be dismal because it is at the cost of national sovereignty, and security of vessels flying the Indian colours.
(Col. R Hariharan, an intelligence specialist on South Asia, is a retired Military Intelligence officer. He served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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