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Paper no. 2406
08-Oct-2007
Chinas New Assertiveness in Nepal
Guest Column by Bhaskar Roy
In an interview (June 17) to the publication Nepal the new China Ambassador to Nepal, Zheng Xialing, said China shall not tolerate any foreign intervention in Nepal. Ambassador Zheng explained, Whenever the Nepali people face any problem or difficulty, China shall treat them as our own especially when the problems pertain to sovereignty or territorial integrity (emphasis added).
A reading of the text of the interview leaves no doubt that it was carefully prepared in advance by the interviewer and the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu to convey certain messages to India and, also, apparently to the USA. For example, the interviewer recalled Chinese Vice Premier Marshall Chen Yi had said China would not tolerate foreign interference in Nepal, and asked whether that policy had changed.
Other important questions included Chinas concerns on Free Tibet campaigners activities in Nepal, acceptance of Nepal as a republic and US views of Maoists as terrorists. This interview can be considered as glimpses into Chinas readjusted foreign policy towards Nepal after the fall of King Gyanendra and the monarchy. Zheng Xialings observations are not idle statements of a senior diplomat, but highly significant and meaningful.
Nepal has been one of the important elements in Chinas Indo-Himalayan strategy to ultimately push the de facto Sino-Indian border from Kashmir to Bhutan closer to Indias heartland. Nepal is one of the five-fingers strategy of late Mao Zedong. It spells Beijings influence and control over Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. To the five fingers, there are indications that a toe is being added. Some of the Tibetans who have been won over by the Chinese are locating along the Indo-Himalayan belt from Ladakh to Sikkim. Kathmandu is one of the very important centers for meetings between China operatives and their Tibetan contacts from India.
Returning to Ambassador Zheng Xialings assurance to protect Nepals sovereignty and territorial integrity including from foreign intervention in Nepal, the hardline from Beijing is unmistakable. To this was the added reference to Marshall Chen Yis similar statement of assurance in 1962.
Reference to 1962 is of particular importance. The Chinese propaganda machinery frequently claims that Indias illegal incursion deeper into Chinese territory was dealt a humiliating blow by the Chinese army, the PLA.
In the context of Nepal, Zhengs statements, obviously cleared by Beijing, does border on not so camouflaged warning to India over Nepals affairs.
There is a territorial problem between India and Nepal over Kalapani, which is with India. The matter was thought to have been a settled issue, till Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly encouraged the Nepalese governement and Palace to reopen the issue during his official visit to Kathmandu in December, 1996. Almost immediately following President Jiangs visit the Nepalese reopened the issue with India both officially and through public protests. According to reports, the Kalapani issue has not gone away and friendly Chinese delegations visiting Nepal allegedly remind the Nepalese periodically. The policy is to keep the fire burning slowly till the time comes to raise the intensity and get it raging.
Nepal had three main pillars, and a fourth one was growing. Beijing nurtured all the three i.e. the Palace, the Royal Nepalese Army (now Nepalese Army), and the Nepali Congress (NC). Given the historic importance of the monarchy, especially the belief among the common people that the king is the reincarnation of the God Vishnu on earth, the Palace was Beijings first choice for friendship. The army leadership was with the Palace and, hence, scripted for Chinese coalition. The NC was a different issue, with its traditional linkages with India, but NC leaders tried to maintain a balance between Beijing and New Delhi. The CPN (UML), among the left parties became particularly close to the Chinese. The CPN (Maoist) had a problem, having gone underground, fighting the monarchy from 1990. That, however, does not mean the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu did not have any contact with the Maoists. They did, but very carefully.
During the peoples uprising led by the Maoists from 2000, Beijing made a strategic policy mistake, something uncharacteristic for them. They believed the Palace with the army would prevail again, and remained openly pro-Palace. But unlike India, China had already set up some controlled institutions in the country through their old friends, but fully controlled by Beijing through their embassy in Kathmandu.
The Nepal China Study Centers (NCSC) and fully funded by China and locally supervised by Madhav Nepal, CPN (UML) leader. While the head office of NCSC in located in Kathmandu, the branch offices numbering now more than seven are located close to the Indian border. These centers are involved in anti-India influence peddling, collection of information, promoting China etc. But the NCSC members can be much more damaging. Their potential to create mischief in the Terai region is enormous, and they can remain undetected. The Terai region is already restive, with no united stand even among the Madhesis.
Another Chinese institution is Nepal-China Mutual Co-operation Society (NCMCS). Again funded through the Chinese Embassy, the co-ordination has been entrusted to Prof. Ballab Mani Dahal. The main task of the NCMCS is to promote China and denigrate India and other US as colonialists and exploiters.
The perception in India that it has come up on top in Nepal is all very well. Maoist supremo Prachanda is on record to thank India for its support to the anti-monarchy movement. India is also mediating in the political crises in Nepal, which would be construed in Chinas strategic calculations as intervention. This is exactly what Ambassador Zheng said in his interview that China would not allow in Nepal.
During the end months of turmoil and the initial stages of return of democracy, China decided to allow India to take the front position. China was in no position to put its foot in the swirling political waters in Nepal. It decided to nourish its constituencies, including firming a better relationship with the Maoists. This is expected to be a totally new relationship.
The China-Nepal railway in the making needs to be viewed in terms of a new strategic advantage for China. The railway project should be operational next year, providing greater connectivity both for passengers and goods between the two countries. It would be a handle for the anti-India Nepalese factions, and would erode to some extant Nepals total dependence on India for access to sea ports, notwithstanding the cost difference. It may also be kept in mind China is always capable of providing friendship prices to friends.
The new political crises in Nepal with the indefinite postponement of the Constituent Assembly (CA) polls for a second time on October 5 could create a fertile ground for Chinese covert intervention. Chinas friends, the CPN (UML) and the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (NMKP) opposed the postponement of the polls, thus dividing the original seven party coalition. The Maoists reneged on the earlier agreement, demanding the country be declared a republic before the CA elections. The reunited NC is sitting rather ineptly in the middle without taking a firm position. Under these conditions Indias leading role in Kathmandu to bring about a reconciliation and emerge as the chief arbitrator in Nepals politics goes against Chinese strategic interests.
Ambassador Zhengs interview portends not only Chinas hard-line policy in Nepal vis-�vis India, but this is likely to extend in their policies to other countries in South Asia to further compress India in its immediate neighborhood. An inimical neighborhood would hamper Indias development and some of the countries of South Asia may be more than willing to play Chinas game. It appears a major foreign policy challenge is coming up. It will not do to sweep things under the carpet. The issue will be too big to hide anywhere. The only answer can be a proactive foreign policy.
(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
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