Paper no. 2409	11-Oct-2007
CHINA: Prepares for the 17th CCP Congress  Guest Column by Bhaskar Roy The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party aka 17th Party Congress is scheduled to commence in Beijing from October 15. This may seem to be an innocuous observation, but it is actually not so. This is the first time that the CCP announced the date of the Party Congress so much in advance, or announced any date at all. The Party Congress, held once in four years except during the Cultural Revolution, used to be held in great secrecy. The reason, perhaps, was that till the last moment differences on policies and personalities went not reconciled. Slowly, the Chinese leadership has been moving towards greater transparency in different areas as part of political reforms. To the western democracies those moves may seem small, laborious steps. In Chinas context, however, these are major strides. After all, these efforts at greater transparency do not only strain at the ultra-secrecy culture of the party established by the leftist and conservatives, but also at the cultural and historical heritage of a closed society. Close to the convening of the 15th Party Congress in 1997, a Hong Kong woman journalist in Beijing had procured a draft copy of the report to be read out by the CCP General Secretary, then Jiang Zemin. The journalist was caught by the security while trying to destroy the document, and was jailed. Jiang Zemin was reportedly furious with the leak of that document, and many other heads rolled. In contrast, the 17th Party Congress about to be convened in a weeks time is making a further break from tradition. Important speeches from Politburo Standing Committee members this year have broadly indicated the tenor and emphasis at the upcoming Congress. The Chinese Communist Party leadership had expected to get over the main problems of reform by the end of the last Century. In 1997, then Premier Zhu Rongji, himself an eminent economist, hoped to complete the reform of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Neither Zhu nor his colleagues foresaw the enormity of the task. This country of 1.2 billion basically relied on the template of SOEs for their livelihood. It used to be said that till the three irons were broken, progress in reform and modernization would be impossible. The three irons were iron bowl (life long supply of food by their work units), iron chair (permanent job whether one could work or not), and iron bed (permanent housing, again supplied by the work units). Providing lifetime social security to employees was a backbreaking task for the SOEs. The industries stagnated. The government was faced with some hard choices-reform the SOEs and be ready to swallow some bitter pills and fight challenges from the conservatives. While the general feeling outside China is the leftists and conservatives have been eradicated, the reality is they are a minority but embedded inside the Party and its Central Committee. Perhaps, this is a good thing too, since they are a balance to some actual capitalist roaders whose only aim is to make money by any means. Reform of the SOEs has its costs, especially in terms of job losses. To this is the additional burden of the number of jobseekers outstripping creation of new jobs, every year. In 2005, there were officially reported 84000 strikes all over the country mainly by laid off workers from SOEs, trying to modernize or closing down because of lack of capital. The business bureaucrat- party apparatchik triangular nexus has contributed to runaway corruption, which is also having its effect on the society. On the one hand corruption encourages more corruption. On the other, the cost is passed on to the society. For example, the construction mafia has deprived a lot of people of their land and immovable property for paltry amounts. Protests are generally put down with a heavy hand. Eighty four thousand strikes and protests, some of them violent, in one year is no small matter for a command political system like China. Though a majority of the strikes were by industrial workers demanding back pay, pension, social security and employment, rural areas and cities also witnessed similar disturbances, mainly over land requisitioned by local government and sold to real estate companies in corrupt deals. The Chinese leaders are highly concerned about the possibility of country wide mass protest against the government and the Communist Party. The leaders have not forgotten about the 1989 Tien An Men square protests basically led by students. They paid a heavy price in quashing it. But a worker peasant outburst will be much bigger in scale and the use of tanks and guns may be far more difficult. Both domestically and internationally something like this could be a disaster. The social indicators do not paint a handsome picture. The urban rural income gap is growing. While government revenue has risen from 1.3 trillion Yuan in 2000 to nearly 4 trillion Yuan in 2006, disposable income share of the people has decreased from 63.8% to 56.5% during the same year. According to Chinese economists and social scientists such a phenomenon is this result of widespread unfair distribution. This would suggest some serious dislocation of the command chair from the top to the bottom. The leadership is highly concerned about social instability in the context of 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Exposition. These are factors of instability beyond the social issues. These include the separatist and real autonomy demands by Uighurs and the Tibetans respectively. The DPP government in Taiwan would not let an opportunity go by to create problems in the mainland and embarrass Beijing in the run up to the Olympic Games. And, of course, the Falun Gong movements endeavor to cause a dent in the Communist Party. These are no small matters. The Chinese leaders are very conscious about their image, especially international image. The Chinese nation cannot lose face. The Chinese image took a serious battering in the last few months starting from the Mattel toys case  when Chinese contractors and subcontractors used toxic paints and Mattel had to  recall its toys world-wide. Though Mattel apologized to the Chinese later under coercion, the damage had been done. Many Chinese export products came under this scanner and dangerous shortcomings were discovered, especially in edibles. It is also intriguing why the Chinese official media released the story the great environmental disaster the Three Gorges dam is turning out to be, just before the Party Congress. Premier Li Peng, a hardliner and conservative, pushed the project through, despite much opposition in 1993. It was to be the largest hydroelectric project in the world, but is turning out to be the worlds biggest single man-made environmental disaster. It is not yet clear if Hu Jintao wanted to put the Three Gorges disaster to twin use beat the leftists with a stick that command directives which ignored experts views, ended in disaster; telling the world about the increasing transparency, similar to the developed countries, that China now showed as a responsible member of international society. In his first term as Party General Secretary, State President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) from 2003 to 2007, Hu Jintao had remained under the shadow of the Shanghai clique led by his predecessor Jiang Zemin. It was with some classical moves that Hu was able to force Jiang to step down from the Chairmanship of CMC in late 2004. But he also ensured that Jiang was given all the regards due to a senior leader. Hu Jintao used late senior leader Deng Xiaopings blessings wisely and frugally. He was chosen by Deng as the head of the fourth generation leadership. He became the youngest member of the Politburo in 1992. Unlike Jiang, who tried a number of propaganda initiatives to project himself the blessed successor of Mao and Deng, Hu let others say he was Dengs chosen man for that particular period. He used Mao Zedong when necessary, Dengs Thoughts more frequently, but the Three Represents theory to which Jiang contributed was out manouvered from Jiangs authorship. Apparently demonstrating his control over the Party, Hu Jintao has left the Party Congress as uncluttered as possible, yet leaving a door open for people to discuss issues and bring them to the Congress deliberations. The bottom line has been drawn, of course. Hu Jintaos master stroke was the removal of Chen Liangyu on charges of corruption. Chen was a powerful player of the Shanghai clique as the Party Secretary of Shanghai Municipality and a Standing  Committee member of the Politburo. Chen is the highest level of party leaders to be prosecuted for corruption. He had embezzled 3 billion yuans from Shanghais pension funds. Delay in payment of pensions has been one of the top agitating issues of retired workers. He was stripped of all posts on July 26 and is being prosecuted. A variety of debates and discussions were encouraged over the past year over political an ideological issues to see what the intellectuals and experts felt in futuristic terms. In a manner it was like Mao Zedongs Hundred Flowers revolution of 1957, but with a difference. Mao was moving towards rigid interpretation of ideology and seeking to identify his critics, allowing apparent freedom of expression - Smoking the snakes out of the grass, as the Chinese proverb goes. Hu Jintao, in contrast, was looking for thoughts and ideas which needed to be corrected within the ambit of democratic centralism. He addressed them in his July 25 speech at the Central Party School in Beijing. Hu Jintao chose the venue of his important address very deliberately. The Central Party School is the nursery for senior level cadres for ideological and political education. For the Party, this school is the heart, and Hu made it clear that he is not willing to be pressurised either by the right or the left. The clamor for fast paced political reform from a section of intellectuals is more romanticism than practical in Chinas context, as  per Hu. His message to the left was there was no going back to abstract (ideological) concepts. Deng Xiaoping had said Guard against the right, but be vigilant about the left. With an eye to both the domestic audience and international observers, Hu Jintao gave indications in broad brush strokes the party policies for the next five years and how they would integrate with the expectations of the rest of the world, particularly the western world. Most of neighboring Asia is expected to accept without question whatever policies the CCP seat in Beijing decides. The west will be assured the will be no wavering from this policy of further reform and socialism with Chinese characteristics. Hu Jintao indicated the 17th Party Congress will continue with the reform of the SOEs  despite various questions and criticisms. The questions on SOE reform arose following the chaotic situation of lay offs etc., but the consensus decision of the Party Center is firm. The reforms must continue, but money must be found to ease the situation of the workers of the State. Even a slowdown of SOE reforms can destabilize the entire process worked upon for almost two decades. There is no easy solution. The combination of Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao are expected to cast off the shadow of the third generation leadership led by Jiang Zemin. Unless they are successful in this venture the rest of their vision and plans would hardly move forward. For development, the approach of the two generations widely differ. While Jiang Zemin prepared the coastal area development approach at the expense of the huge hinterland, Hu has focused on more equitable distribution of investment in the under developed areas of the country and the rural areas. One index of Hus success already visible is the reverse flow of migrant workers from provincial level factories because of better opportunities back home. Over the last year, Hu Jintao has been quietly engaged in personnel reorganization. A number of former Communist Youth League (CYL) leaders were posted as provincial leaders including as provincial party secretaries and governors. The CYL is Hus main constituency of support. He headed the CYL when he came to Deng Xiaopings notice. The central leadership is also expected to see induction of more leaders with CYL background. Hu and Wen Jiabao have had the leadership careers honed in difficult and backward provinces and would expectedly have significant support from them.  Recently, a widescale reorganization of the PLA took place, with top leadership changes in five of the seven Military Regions (MRs). Even those senior officers who were to retire after the Party Congress have been persuaded to put in their papers in advance. The PLA is a very important base of the Party and will be sending the largest number of delegates from any single body to the 17th Party Congress. Hu, who is also the Chairman of the CMC needs to sideline the Jiang appointees and bring in his own. Finally, it appears, Hu Jintao in likely to put his personal stamp of the leading theoretician on the CCP Constitution, and also identify his successor to take over at the 18th Party Congress. From the discussions in the Chinese official media, Hus theoretical contribution is expected to be Scientific Development Approach with the building of a Harmonious Society as the underpinning for socialism with Chinese characteristics. Hu Jintaos first big challenge in his second leadership term will be an incident-free, high profile Beijing Olympic Games next year. The games are intimately connected with the pride of the entire Chinese nation, and are no less important than any other priority task facing the country. This would be a test of the ideological and political strength and legitimacy of the CCP for the Chinese people. The gain for the CCP and Hu Jintao of a successful Beijing Olympics is unimaginable. (The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. The views expressed by the author are his own.  He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
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