Paper no. 2416

18-Oct-2007

RUSSIA: PRESIDENT PUTINS VISIT TO IRAN IS A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE TO UNITED STATES 

By Dr. Subhash Kapila 

Introductory Observations 

President Putins visit to Iran this week (October 16-17, 2007) has taken place at a strategically significant juncture both for Iran and Russia.  This visit has taken place at a moment when the confrontational rhetoric between the United States and Iran has become shriller and the Western countries seem to be lining up behind the United States on the insistence that the Iranian nuclear program is geared towards nuclear weapons production and that Iran should cease it.  Military strikes against Iran as an option has not been ruled out by USA and the West. 

It has been rightly observed by some analysts that against the above backdrop, the Russian Presidents timing of his visit to Iran has thrown a virtual lifeline to Iran in its brinkmanship with the United States primarily.  It is also significant that this is the first visit by a Russian President to Iran since 1943 and also that President Putin made the visit in defiance of reports of assassination threats while visiting Iran.   

The United States confrontation with Iran is no longer confined to the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  The United States focus has transcended and enlarged into a wider strategic design of pre-empting the emergence of Iran as the major regional power in the Middle East. 

The strategic significance of the Russian Presidents visit to Iran at the present juncture needs to be analyzed contextually in relation to the United States wider design of preventing emergence of Iran as a regional power. 

The media coverage of the Russian Presidents visit to Iran has been extensive and therefore this Author would not dwell on the two summits that took place in Teheran.  The first being the Caspian Sea Summit followed by President Putins meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Ahmedinejad. 

This paper intends to analyze the strategic significance and strategic implications of President Putins visit to Iran on a wider canvas by focusing on the following issues: 

  • Russias Political Signaling to the United States at the Global Level
  • Russian Presidents Third Strategic Foray to the Middle East: Implications for United States
  • Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership?

Russias Political Signaling to the United States at the Global Level 

Russias resurgence and its determined bid under President Putin to reclaim its status as the second pole in the global strategic calculus and as an independent global power center has been covered in this Authors papers in the last five years or so.  Papers are referred in the Annexure. 

Russias resurgence lately has been made possible and impelled lately by a combination of factors, chief of which being: (1) Russias nationalistic aspirations under President Putin (2) United States condescending attitudes towards Russia (3) NATOs eastward enlargement towards Russian borders engineered by the United States (4) United States military presence in Central Asia (5) United States Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) deployments in Eastern Europe (6) Russias increasing oil revenues facilitating modernization and up-gradation of strategic assets (7) Russias intensified strategic partnership with China. 

Russias strategic sensitivities seem to have been strongly impacted by NATOs eastward enlargement, US military presence in Central Asia and the BMD deployment plans in Eastern Europe, in particular.  Russia has perceived these developments as a strategic hemming-in of Russia and also as creation of strategic pressure points on Russias sensitive peripheries. 

President Putins counter-responses have not been late in coming.  He has sought to split the Atlantic Alliance by use of economic coercion on the strength of Russian oil and gas supplies to Europe and warnings that countries hosting BMD deployments would be targeted by Russias nuclear weapons.  Enlargement of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Caspian Sea Summit which he attended in Teheran this week were other counter-responses. 

However, the visit to Iran by President Putin against the backdrop of the rising crescendo against Iran on the nuclear threat issue has to be viewed as a major strategic challenge to the United States. 

It demonstrates Russias determination to respond to strategic hemming-in of Russia by use of counter-pressure points against United States.  Nothing could be more crucial for the United States than that by standing alongside Iran presently, Russia in one stroke knocks out the entire rationale of the United States case against Iran. 

President Putins visit to Russia was preceded by meetings with the German President and the French President.  It was also preceded by visits to Moscow of the US Secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary.  All of them undoubtedly tried to prevail over President Putin to dissuade Iran from its nuclear program during his meeting with Iranian leaders. 

Before leaving for Iran, President Putin made it abundantly clear publicly that no objective data or information was available to suggest that Iran was on  the path to produce nuclear weapons.  President Putin decried the United States and Western countries talk of military strikes against Iran. 

In the opinion of this Author, with all roads leading to Moscow and US and Western dignitaries making a bee-line to solicit President Putins assistance on the Iranian nuclear issue would suggest that Russia has been successful in reclaiming a crucial role in the global strategic calculus. 

The most important Russian political signal to the United States seems to be that increasingly Russia would have to be conceded strategic space in the management of global strategic affairs. 

Russian Presidents Third Strategic Foray to the Middle East: Implications for United States 

In a space of just over two years since April 2005, President Putin of Russia has made three strategic forays to the Middle East which has been the traditional strategic preserve of the United States.  References of this Authors papers covering the first two trips are given in the Annexure.  In 2005 President Putin made his first strategic foray by visiting Egypt and Israel along with meetings with Palestinian leaders. 

Earlier this year, President Putin made his second strategic foray when he visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan.  All these three monarchial countries are strong allies of the United States in the Middle East and hosting US military presence in the region. 

President Putins third strategic foray to the Middle East has taken place in October 2007 with a visit to Iran within eight months of his last foray.  This underscores Russias bid to displace the United States exclusive presence from the security architecture of the Middle East that it had crafted over the years. 

Within a span of eight months, the Russian President has covered both the littorals of The Gulf and the political divide that separates the littorals in the region.  Iran in any case since the early 1990s was emerging as a pro-Russian state but Putins visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, all pro-US and fearful of Iran imparts Russia and President Putin with a rare strategic halo.

In marked contrast to the demonization of Iran by the US policy establishment President Putin during his visit to Iran made the following dramatic announcements in Teheran: (1) Iran is a World Power (2) Irans nuclear program is for civilian use (3) Caspian Sea regional countries will not allow the use of their territory for attacks against any other Caspian Sea country (4) Cautioned USA, West and Israel against any military strikes against Iran. 

The above Russian statements carry fair strategic and military implications for the United States and Iran.  

The overall impact on the United States as a result of President Putins three strategic forays to the Middle East can be summed up as follows:

  • Russias stands on Iran are in strategic contradiction to those of the United States and the West.
  • Irans Arab neighbors should logically feel less worried with Russia asserting that the Iranian nuclear program is not weapons-specific. Implicit would be a Russian message that their threat perceptions on Iran should therefore need to be revised.
  • Irans international isolation is that much more lessened with the Russian President visit and his statements.
  • The Russian President has politically, if not strategically, been successful in embracing staunch US allies in the Middle East i.e. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Qatar and significantly Saudi Arabia.
  • That these strategically important nations of the Middle East should be opening up to a resurgent Russia is evidence of Russias growing international clout and also evidence of Arab nations intent to expand their strategic horizons in terms of options beyond the United States.
  • In sharp contrast to the United States image in the Middle East taking a beating because of Iraq and Afghanistan the image of Russia and the Russian President is bound to soar with the perception that Russia is an Arab and Moslem Nations Friendly power.

The above developments are likely to have a significant impact on American security interests in the Middle East with the changed strategic situation of Arab and Moslem countries opening up to a resurgent Russia.  

Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership? 

With the Russian President throwing a life-line to Iran at a critical juncture when it could be subjected to military strikes by USA and the West, can one say that a Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership has emerged substantially? 

Russia so far does not seen to have applied the term strategic partnership to its relationship with Iran. 

Analysts in the West are prone to highlight that many issues divide Russia and Iran. They cite the following reasons. (1) Russia and Iran have competing or conflicting interests in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea Region (2) Iran perceives that Russia is using Iran as a pawn in its global power games (3) Russias invitation to USA to use its radar facilities in the Caucasus, which could facilitate US monitoring of Iran (4) Russia finds Iran a difficult partner to deal with. 

Notwithstanding the above, it can be safely asserted that in the prevailing strategic situation obtainable to Russia and Iran, there are more imperatives that unite them than which divide them. 

While one could say that a substantial Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership does not exist but it could be said that substantial Russia-Iran Strategic Cooperation exists in all fields from the nuclear to the military. 

To some extent, it could be said that the Russia-Iran relationship in its present form does provide a dissuasive effect against any military action by the United States and the West against Iran. 

To reinforce such a dissuasive effect it would not be improbable for Russia to provide Iran with military assets which could make the cost of any likely US military intervention against Iran prohibitive in terms of military costs. 

Concluding Observations 

The Middle East once again seems to be reviving as an important strategic chessboard for the competing national security interests of the United States and Russia.  

Russia seems to be at a growing advantage on the Middle East strategic chessboard as a result of the three strategic forays that President Putin has made into this region in a span of just over two years. 

With United States influence waning in the Middle East as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan and perceptions in the Middle East that the United States is an anti-Moslems power, the strategic influence of Russia is likely to grow in the region on the rebound.  

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)

ANNEXURE:

  • RUSSIA: President Putins Second Strategic Foray in the Middle East (February 2007) (Paper No. 2154 Dated 28.02.2007)
  • Russia Asserts Its Resurgent Strategic Autonomy (Paper No. 2090 dated 09.01.2007)
  • Russias Foreign Policy in a Resurgent Mode: An Analysis (Paper No. 1682 dated 19.01.2006)
  • Russian President Forays in the Middle East (April 2005): An Estimative Analysis (Paper No. 1363 dated 03. 05. 2005)
  • Iran in the Strategic Matrix of Russia, China and India: An Analysis (Paper No. 1284 dated 09. 03. 2005)

 

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